Though powerful as general tools, automated measures of position-taking in text often perform poorly when models of speech are difficult to develop or theoretically contested. Rather than model text,
Over the last two decades, there has been dramatic growth in the use of text data to measure the ideological leanings of parties, candidates and voters (Benoit et al. 2009; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Slapin and Proksch 2008) . Though early pioneers utilized coders to analyze the content of text, recent work has turned to powerful automated approaches to scale word usage on a common space (Lauderdale and Clark 2014; Laver et al. 2003; Slapin and Proksch 2008 ). Yet, scaling speech automatically has proven to be challenging in many contexts (e.g., Lauderdale and Herzog 2016; Quinn et al. 2010 ).
Current models of political behavior, including utility accounts of legislative voting, often transport imperfectly to the domain of word choice, especially when speech is insincere or institutionally unconstrained.
1 Compounding this difficulty, scholars frequently disagree about which theoretical accounts explain how politicians communicate to the public, and thus what metrics can serve as appropriate benchmarks for scaling speech. Consequently, in evaluating a new approach, disputes over whether a novel measure is valid can become indistinguishable with whether a particular theory of political communication is correct.
Instead of modeling the latent structure of words, I develop an experimental approach that taps collective perceptions to directly measure the content of political speech. I randomly assign political statements to subjects, in a large-N survey, and ask them to infer particular features from the messages. In this study, I present survey subjects with statements drawn from U.S. House and Senate campaign advertisements, and ask them to guess the party (or ideological leaning) of the candidate featured in each ad. Ads are then scaled as their average party perception score. Unlike previous survey-based approaches that exhibit bias due to how co-partisans locate politicians or messages in ideological space (Ansolabehere and Brady 1989) , I find the inferential nature of the party guessing task virtually eliminates partisan biases in measuring ads. By placing people behind 1 Sparsity can also make it difficult to model complex uses of language, including word interactions, e.g., "woman's right to choose" vs. "woman's right to choose her doctor." a veil of uncertainty, the design taps the independent wisdom of crowds. Consequently, this scaling approach is remarkably reliable in both representative and non-representative samples, and across a variety of experimental conditions. Further, replacing party with ideological labels, I show that party perception scores are indistinguishable from a liberalconservative dimension in the mind of the American voter.
I implement this party guessing design in three waves. On the basis of these results, in a final guessing wave, I recruit a highly unrepresentative MTurk sample to score a much larger set of 2,103 general election ads aired in 2008
as collected by the Wisconsin Ads Project (CMAG). Subjects were allowed to evaluate as many ads as they wanted, and though statements were randomly ordered across survey tasks, these were not randomly assigned to subjects. Nevertheless, perception scores are again virtually identical for the 200 ads that overlap in the above waves, strongly confirming the replicability of this inferential mode of scaling campaign advertising.
In the second half of this study, I develop a number of tests to validate party perception scores against two automated scaling alternatives: Wordfish and Wordscores (Laver et al. 2003; Slapin and Proksch 2008) . I investigate which words are most predictive within each scaling approach to assess whether these scorings are sensible. I then conduct vignette experiments in the CCES, presenting real candidates airing one of 75 randomly selected positive ads. In the vignettes, subjects are asked to place candidates on a liberal-conservative scale, given the ad statements and some additional policy information. Notable to the design, the randomized ads were previously scored through party
guessing by an entirely different sample of survey respondents. The results show subjects updated their ideological perceptions of the candidates in line with ad party perception scores, but not as predicted by Wordfish or Wordscores scalings, indicating party guessing is a better measure of the policy information voters actually access and incorporate.
One major contribution of this study is the construction of new measures of candidate position-taking in a large number of ads from the 2008 election. Using this larger sample of ads measured in wave three, I illustrate how party perception scores can be used to explore a number of central theories about electoral advertising, including whether campaigns converge over the cycle to target median voters or consistently emphasize their partisan or positional differences. For this, I measure the correlation between ad party guesses, district presidential vote, and scaled roll calls. As an additional validation, I compare this to analogous correlations using Wordfish and Wordscores, finding that party perception scores are consistently correlated with district presidential vote and roll call positions, while the automated estimates are inconsistent predictors of both. Lastly, I explore a number of ways in which the party guessing approach can be incorporated into machine learning and the automated scaling of text data, and propose extensions to measuring ideology going beyond political advertising in the American two-party context.
Prior Approaches to Scaling Speech
Scaling the behaviors of political elites on an ideological dimension has had a long pedigree in political science (Clinton et al. 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . Early on, researchers utilized survey respondents to locate political actors on some pre-defined ideological scale (e.g., 'Very Liberal' to 'Very Conservative'). Yet, among other concerns, motivated partisans would often evaluate in-and out-party politicians in expressive ways, biasing the resulting measures (Ansolabehere and Brady 1989 ). An important innovation was to move away from having biased or imperfectly-informed voters make judgements about politicians' positions, and to instead infer these using a utility model of legislative choice (Clinton et al. 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . From the basic premise that legislators support proposals closer to their most preferred policy than the existing policies these aim to replace, researchers have produced a powerful measurement tool that can reliably summarize a great deal of the conflict within and across Congresses.
The analysis of position-taking in text data has taken a parallel course, with much of the early work employing coders to rate various dimensions in political documents (Benoit et al. 2009; Feinstein and Schickler 2008; Gerring 2001; Riker 1996 ). Yet, the recent explosion in the availability of political texts has led scholars to substitute laborintensive content analysis with efforts to automate the granular analysis of text-data.
This automated analysis of political text generally takes one of two forms. An unsupervised approach extends the utility framework of legislative voting into the domain of political speech, modeling words as being used based on how 'close' they are to describing a person's ideal policy position (Monroe and Maeda 2004; Slapin and Proksch 2008) . Alternative supervised methods score words based on how well they predict an annotation (e.g., party), with documents scaled as their expected 'prediction score'.
A widely-used implementation of this unsupervised utility approach is the Wordfish model developed by Slapin and Proksch (2008) . Accordingly, speech takes the form:
The Poisson parameter, λ ij , increases in the number of times legislator i speaks word j, measured by W ij . The term ρ i measures the verbosity of i, while ψ j measures the obscurity of j. The term β j measures the amount of discrimination in j, or the degree to which the word is likely to be used mostly by liberals rather than conservatives. This word discrimination parameter plays an important role, tuning how much influence the legislator ideal point µ i plays in determining the frequency that i speaks word j.
Supervised methods differ in an important way from unsupervised ones in aiming to score texts based on the empirical association between the string of words W i used by i, and some document outcome P i , typically party. One groundbreaking variant of this method, Wordscores, builds a dictionary of 'liberal' and 'conservative' words, and scores texts based on the frequency in which these ideological words are used (Laver et al. 2003 
Then a word score B j is built (assuming a word weight and polarity of ±1) as B j = p(R|W j ) − p(D|W j ). Individual word scores are then used to scale the ith document as
where W ij is the count of word j in i, and |W i | is the total number of words in i.
Since their development, both frameworks have been innovative and influential in political science (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Lowe 2008; Monroe et al. 2008 ). Yet, each method has important limitations. Unsupervised utility models offer an awkward fit for studying political speech. Further, these models will not work in all settings, including when speech is strategic or words convey little ideological meaning. 2 Alternatively, Wordscores assumes words have equal discrimination weight, and thus can overfit data (Lowe 2008; Monroe et al. 2008) . It also eschews prior information to help smooth estimates when words exclusively appear in only conservative or liberal documents.
3 As practical heuristics, however, both approaches have proved quite successful in a number of contexts, especially scaling ideology in party platforms (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Laver et al. 2003; Lo et al. 2014; Slapin and Proksch 2008) .
The Validation Tautology
Though automated scaling methods differ in core assumptions, all fundamentally rely on some form of validation to assess the quality of their estimates (Benoit et al. 2016; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Laver et al. 2011; Lowe and Benoit 2013) . Further, this validation step always requires substantive judgements or strong theoretical assumptions that generally cannot be tested (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2007; Budge and Pennings 2007) .
A common validation strategy is to assume some prior ideological scale is the correct benchmark that accurately depicts political behavior in some domain, and to compare the novel measure against this baseline. For legislatures, the standard benchmark is DWNominate, or similar ideal point scalings of roll call voting (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) .
Scholars also frequently use measures of voter opinion (e.g., district presidential vote), to assess whether a new legislative scale meaningfully reflects the policy responsiveness thought to derive from the electoral connection (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013) .
2 If politicians avoid discussing policy then words will have no discrimination (Stokes 1992; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009 ). More broadly, it is unclear how well speech can be modeled generally in terms of preferences, which emerge from axioms of choice.
3 Recently scholars have adapted these to be more fully Bayesian, including developing flexible models of political language (Lauderdale and Herzog 2016; Monroe et al. 2008) . . Ads are parsed into 1-gram words, stemmed and pruned of stop-words, then scaled using Wordfish and Wordscores models, with scores aggregated to the candidate-level. Roll call voting is scaled using standard DW-Nominate, and Presidential Vote is (normalized) state-or district-level proportion of party vote for president.
To illustrate this validation approach, I present such a comparison in Figure 1 , using Ultimately, this validation is tautological. These comparisons necessarily assume that roll call records or voter attitudes are the appropriate benchmarks to assess the behavior of candidates in campaign mode. The fundamental challenge is that these weak correlations cannot tell us whether the text-based scales are poorly measured, or that it is wrong to assume campaign positioning is meant to reflect legislative behavior or voter opinion.
5
There are long-standing debates over whether campaigns avoid discussing issues (Stokes 1992) , or appeal to their more extreme primary supporters (Snyder and Ting 2002) , rather than faithfully discussing a candidate's record or targeting centrists (Henderson 2015) . To verify the correct assumption among these alternatives, we require additional information that a particular scaling of speech is itself valid. But, this would obviate the need for further validation using benchmarks. In this study, I propose an altogether different approach, tapping independent human judgement to scale campaign speech.
markets in 2008 as collected by CMAG. Data described in more detail below.
5 Similar concerns arise elsewhere. Lauderdale and Herzog (2016) and Quinn et al. (2010) find that certain unsupervised methods do a poor job at measuring ideological positions in legislative speech, given the amount of non-policy discussion that occurs on the floor.
Both studies innovate by incorporating additional model structure to improve ideal point or topic measurement, though it is unclear similar structuring would be effective in the more free-wheeling campaign context. See the Appendix for scaling approach that directly incorporates additional theoretical structure in models of campaign speech.
The experimental framework I develop uses collective voter perceptions to scale political speech on an ideological dimension. A large number of respondents are shown randomly selected political texts, and asked to infer a politician's party from the statements. The design fits within a broader, burgeoning field of crowdsourcing to efficiently analyze data by distributing narrow rating tasks widely to a large number of coders (Benoit et al. 2016; Budak et al. 2016; Honaker et al. 2013; Lowe and Benoit 2013; Ororbia II et al. 2015) . Scholars frequently crowdsource to validate automated analyses of text (Benoit et al. 2016; Lowe and Benoit 2013) . Though increasingly, massive coding tasks are being used in political science to produce novel measures of media coverage (Budak et al. 2016; Ororbia II et al. 2015) , campaign persuasion (Henderson 2015) , democratization (Honaker et al. 2013) , and sentiment in speech (Montgomery and Carlson 2016) .
In this work, crowdsourcing is most effective when average voters (rather than experts)
are the intended recipients of speech, and when coding instruments are clear and concise (Ororbia II et al. 2015) . Moreover, crowdsourcing offers particular advantages over machine learning when speech is sparse (e.g., in thirty-second ads), since people do not rely on the degree of co-occurrence between words to grasp meaning.
6
In this application, I tap coder inferences to analyze position-taking in campaign advertisements. Formally, K respondents are recruited for the rating task, with the kth respondent randomly shown some political statement S i . Each respondent makes an inference about the statement, denoted here as R ik = 0, 1. From random assignment, we can consider this inference to be a random variable, R ik ∼ Bernoulli(π ik ). The goal is to elicit many ratings, sampling from R ik , to identify some ad-level ideology score 6 A clear advantage to automated approaches is the ability to explore a high dimensional space of word frequencies, regardless of whether obscure language is used. Crowdsourcing the analysis of bill sponsorship, for example, would likely be ineffective (or very expensive) since legislative language is often lengthy and inscrutable.
Clearly, repeated samples from R ik would not be independent, since respondents are likely to remember their previous evaluations of the same statements. Instead, each ad S i is randomly assigned, without replacement, to a subset of M respondents to produce a vector of 'perception' scores,R i = R i1 , R i2 , ..., R iM . Random assignment ensures that ratings of the same ad across different coders are independent, or R ik ⊥ ⊥ R im , ∀k = m, denoted here as Scorer Independence (A1):
The number of M ratings per statement must be large enough to consistently measure π i . In this design, N different ads (typically 8) are shown to each respondent, so that every ad-statement receives more than 140 ratings. This assignment produces a series of responses for each m coder,R m = R 1m , R 2m , ..., R N m . Responses are also assumed to be independent of the order in which ads are rated, or Item Independence (A2):
Order might matter if people learn over the course of the survey task. Yet, this will not systematically impact overall ad-scores when the number of ratings per respondent is fixed, since each ad is equally likely to appear at any point in the ordering.
8
In this framework, the 'true' scoring µ i of S i can only be indirectly estimated by tapping people's perceptions, denoted as µ im = f m (µ i ). Without additional assumptions, this inferential design can measure the degree of partisanship a particular sample of M 7 The design is related to classic item-response testing (IRT), where an indicator C ik = 1 − (P i − R ik ), measuring whether an inference is correct, is modeled as a function of test-taker ability a k , and item difficulty
8 The Appendix presents experiments showing that any possible item dependence is ignorable in practice, not surprising since there are relatively few coding tasks per respondent.
voters perceives about a set of ad-statements:
If the sample is representative, then it is reasonable to interpret the scoreR i = mR The core concern is that crowdsourced perceptions may be biased or error-prone, so that scorings depend on a particular sample of coders. Complex, long or difficult tasks could yield low-quality responses, or require expertise and knowledge to navigate. In such cases, variation in coder ability could impact precision in the scores. 9 Another issue is that respondents' characteristics could influence their perceptions of ads. In the U.S., many voters have strong attachments to one of the two parties through their party identification (PID). A task that has voters evaluate platforms, news stories or advertisements featuring the parties or their candidates could suffer significant bias from the motivated interests of co-partisans (Ansolabehere and Brady 1989; Budak et al. 2016 ).
The key innovation in the approach developed here is to tap the inferences people make about speech as a way to collect natural measures of partisanship or ideology.
By removing all identifying party and ideology references, subjects are placed behind a partisan veil of ignorance, subject to uncertainty in the task. Since only the policy statements in ads are ever seen by respondents, we can be assured that this is the information they are using to make judgements. Further, respondents must first infer party, before motivated reasoning can be activated. And in facing uncertainty, guessers are likely to mute their motivated responses to avoid negatively evaluating co-partisans. Finally, the party guessing task is clear and straightforward, with right and wrong answers, making it simple to implement and easy for respondents to follow.
Nevertheless, interpreting party perception scores as estimates of latent ad-locations µ i , requires an identicality assumption. The weakest possible assumption is Weak Mono-
This ensures thatR i retains ordinality in µ i . A stronger assumption is Conditional Agreement (A4) in perceptions:
In words, after controlling for differences in all relevant coder characteristics X, everyone can agree on how liberal or conservative each ad is in expectation, over the full range of µ. Combining A3 and A4, any continuous scoringR i |X, for statements i = 1, 2, ..., S, is a consistent estimate of voter perceptions of campaign positioning Φ(f (µ i )). 
Implementing Guessing in CCES and MTurk
For this study, the guessing experimental design was implemented in three survey waves. The first was conducted in the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study 10 If Φ(f (µ i )) is a continuous probability measure, thenR i |X retains cardinality in f (µ), though not necessarily in µ.. If ads are meant to be interpreted by voters, then it is most appropriate to focus on estimating their perceptions in f (µ), since these ground theories of electoral behavior, rather than considering some noumenal ad-location µ.
(CCES), while the second and third waves were fielded using subjects recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in 2015 and 2016. The CCES study included a total of 1,800 respondents, and was conducted two weeks before the 2014 election, with a follow-up post-election survey held the week after the election. 11 The 2015 MTurk study (wave two) recruited an additional 4,853 respondents, randomly assigning them into one of 6 survey frames, to be completed online through Qualtrics. The CCES included a large number of pre-treatment controls among the battery of common content questions.
Additionally, 17 of these covariates were also collected in the 2015 MTurk study to assess and correct any differences between MTurk and CCES samples. protocol is included in Figure I in the Appendix.)
The current CCES data uses the survey weights and matching created by YouGov.
Using the full, unmatched and unweighted data does not change any results.
12 Controls include: gender, race, age, education, income, turnout, registration, 2012 vote choice, news interest, party majority in the House, ideological placements of the Democrats, Republicans, and oneself, and 7-point PID.
13 The outcome ordering was randomly reversed for each respondent, with 'Not sure' always appearing in the middle. Thus, the ordering was consistent for each respondent, but randomly flipped across respondents.
The 2015 MTurk survey extends and validates the party guessing results from the CCES, using 50 of the same ads included in that study, and 50 additional ads originally left out. Respondents in the MTurk Frame 1 (N = 1, 268) participated in an identical experimental frame as those in the CCES study. These respondents were asked to read 8 short positive and negative ads, and to guess the party of the candidate featured in each, using the same response, outcome and randomization structure described above. The structure in Frame 2 (N = 1, 220) is identical to that in Frame 1, with the important exception that respondents were asked to infer the ideology, rather than party of featured candidates. Here respondents choose whether each ad promotes or attacks a 'Liberal'
or 'Conservative' candidate, or that they are 'Not sure', with these similarly randomly reversed. The remaining Frames 3 -6 provide robustness checks on the basic design. examine the validity of these party perception scores through a series of additional tests.
The resulting party perception scores recovered for 150 ads in the CCES experiments 16 The name Clark ensures a common baseline across experiments, though voters may use candidate gender to infer party (Goggin et al. 2015) . In a third MTurk wave, I randomize name and gender, and find that male candidates only shift guesses additively rightward. better at identifying which party is airing negative (63%), rather than positive ads (53%), and this is largely symmetrical across the parties. Thus, there are many positive Republican ads that signal consistent 'Democratic' messages, and many Democratic ads that make traditionally 'Republican' appeals, but counter-stereotypical attacks are rarer.
18
A possible explanation for this result is that positive ads may convey limited issue is perceived to be a Republican (hence is a Democratic attack ad), while positive values indicate the target is perceived to be a Democrat (hence a Republican attack ad).
18 Counter-stereotypical attacks are interesting -Democrats are sometimes attacked for voting to increase health care costs or cut Social Security, while Republicans are readily attacked for raising taxes or increasing deficit spending.
information, making it hard for voters to discern distinct policy positions, while negative ads are more clarifying (Stokes 1992; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009) . Alternatively, candidates may emphasize counter-stereotypical issues or positions to portray themselves as relative moderates in their positive ads, while attacking their opponents as partisan extremists (Henderson 2015) .
19 Importantly, the feasibility of the measure does not depend on either theoretical view. Rather it relies on voters interpreting actual campaign signals in a process akin to how they might learn about competing candidates in real elections.
In contrast, automated approaches to scale campaign speech could have considerable difficulty recovering this dimensionality, since these fundamentally rely on political speech to be non-strategic, distinguishing rather than obscuring candidates' policy differences.
The inferential framework developed here produces reasonable variation in party perception scores. Moreover, these highlight potentially interesting communication strategies employed by candidates that may elude traditional automated approaches to scaling text.
Next, I present evidence that these party perception scores map directly onto an ideological dimension arrayed along on a liberal-conservative scale. For this, I replicate the inferential experiments from above using ideological rather than partisan labels to evaluate 100 ads in the 2015 MTurk study in Frame 2, as described above. A scatterplot of the resulting scores are presented in Figure 3 . The plot presents average party guesses from the MTurk Frame 1 on the x-axis (exactly replicating the CCES frame using 1,268
MTurk respondents), and average ideology guesses in Frame 2 on the y-axis (utilizing 1,220 coders). As seen, the correlation between the two scores is ρ = 0.97, and the 19 Results in the Appendix strongly suggest that avoidance or ambiguity cannot explain misclassification differences across tone. The 200 spots were selected to ensure positive ads had similar amounts of issue information as negative ones. Experiments in MTurk
Frame 6 show that party is misclassified at higher rates for more, rather than less policy-specific positive ads, with the opposite holding for negativity. And this difference is exacerbated when comparing similarly rated, specific positive and negative ads. Party perception scores are not interpretable as ideal points in a traditional way, since these are not based on any utility model of choice. One concern in interpreting this invariance between partisan and ideological perceptions, is that it could result from voters first inferring party in the ad, and then attaching some ideological label to it, simply from knowing that Democrats are liberal and Republicans are conservative. 20 We cannot peer into the minds of voters to see how they independently perceive party and ideology in 20 The opposite inference from ideology to party is also possible. An implication of this two-step process might be greater variance in guessing ideology, since it involves making two different inferences about partisan ads. This greater variance does not emerge.
ads. Nonetheless, this evidence strongly demonstrates that ideology and party inferences produce indistinguishable measures of ad content. 
Assessing the Reliability of Party Perception Scores
As previously discussed, an important concern in using voters to evaluate political texts is that people might differ in how they rate the same statements based on certain of their characteristics (Ansolabehere and Brady 1989) . This possible heterogeneity in voter inferences, encapsulated in A4 above (Eq. 6), could yield variation in aggregate party perception scores when crowdsourced samples differ significantly in their characteristics. Controlling for X covariate differences across coder samples could be necessary to ensure the inferential task is reliable, and that resulting perception scores are comparable.
Any differences in PID seem particularly paramount given the central role it plays as a perceptual screen of information for voters in the American context (Zaller 1992 ).
I present the results here from a replication of the party guessing experiments using a convenience sample of MTurk workers in Frame 1 to provide a strong test of the (conditional) reliability of the inferential approach to scale texts. Berinsky et al. (2012) explores the use of MTurk for survey research and finds that its population of workers who complete surveys are much less representative of the U.S. than samples recruited online by commercial vendors. I also find large and statistically significant differences on 16 of 17 demographic and political covariates collected in the both CCES study and the MTurk replication. (Differences are presented in Table I in the Appendix.) MTurk respondents are much younger, more likely to be male and white, less participating, and poorer, but better educated, more knowledgeable about politics, and most importantly, more Democratic and liberal. While all of these differences could have impact, the last two (Democratic PID and liberalism) could particularly skew party guessing in ways that
21 Notably, this is also true of legislative ideal points which cannot distinguish between whether they measure partisan consistency or ideological extremity. All models are OLS, and include additional controls, with unit and ad cluster standard errors. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
bias raw comparisons across the two sample frames.
The scope of these concerns, a priori, can be seen in and Brady (1989) , respondents appear to believe that their own partisan or ideological complexion is mirrored in the ads they are randomly shown in the task. Party perception scores thus may indeed depend on the particular sample of coders used to rate ads.
Given these individual-level findings, I present a series of scatterplots comparing average party perception scores for 50 overlapping ads from the CCES and the MTurk Frame 1, with and without controlling for important covariates. Controlling for X was conducted through 'residualizing' the perception scores, retaining the average of the residuals for each ad from the regressions presented in Table 1 , so scores only retain systematic variation orthogonal to sample covariates. Scatterplots are presented in Figure 4 . Immediately we see in the plots that perception scores look essentially identical across the samples regardless of conditioning on X. The top-left panel shows raw scores for the CCES and MTurk, which are highly correlated at ρ = 0.94 without adjusting for any covariates. This invariance is remarkable given the above evidence about systematic factors influencing individual perceptions. Moreover, this reliability is retained across all four panels, with and without controls -if anything, residualizing out the influence of X slightly reduces the similarity in scores as shown in the bottom-right panel, though correlations never 22 Regression coefficients are OLS, with standard errors clustered at both the respondentand ad-level due to both having repeat evaluations in the task. Table 1 .
drop below ρ = 0.935. One central explanation for this reliability is that by randomizing texts and placing voters behind a veil of uncertainty, the inferential task eliminates any systematic dependence between candidates' party and respondents' partisan evaluations, so the influence of individual-level characteristics cancels out in the aggregate. Republican identifiers, though the same rank-ordering is retained across both frames. stratified by respondent party identity (PID). PID is measured using a standard 7-point scale, with leaners coded as partisans. Raw scores are the sample averages of ad party inferences, while residualized scores are averages of the residuals for each ad taken from an OLS regression of individual ad-inferences on X covariates, presented in Table 1 .
In a final test of reliability, I stratify party guesses by PID. This stratification can illuminate how much partisans differ in their inferences for in-versus out-party ads.
These differences could pose particular challenges if identifiers are significantly imbalanced across coder samples. Alternatively, if bias in partisan guessing is simply additive, and partisans agree on the ordering of ads, then this would be a minor issue in scaling. Republican. And at least with PID, bias appears to be mostly additive, and thus is likely to be cancelled out in the aggregate. Other biases may emerge, but it is hard to imagine any more powerful in this context than PID. Further, the above invariance in overall guessing between MTurk and CCES adds weight to the claim that any such biases cancel out in the aggregate as well.
Validating Party Perception Scores
Party perception scores are invariant to whether subjects are asked to infer the party or ideology of candidates, or differ along a range of important covariates, like PID, education or political interest. These findings strongly suggest that through an inference task, very different voters can agree in the aggregate on the ordering of ads based on their partisan and ideological content. While consistent across survey contexts, however, it is possible that voter perceptions may not be the ideal way to scale political texts. Coders could be collectively myopic, consistently misjudging the content of ads. Or exposure to the ad-texts could have alternative treatment effects that influence voters in ways that feedback into the rating task. Fundamentally then, it is important to validate this method of crowdsourcing scaling through a number of tests, and in particular by comparing perception scores against the best-practices alternatives, Wordscores and Wordfish. which plots Wordscores and Wordfish scales, showing that each largely recovers the same dimensionality (ρ = 0.78) in word-usage. As described above, a potential explanation for this difference is that automated approaches may have a difficult time scaling ads when these are aimed at communicating strategic messages. Alternatively, it is possible that respondents miss important information in ads that automated approaches are better at measuring through models of the multidimensional space of words.
A way to assess these alternative interpretations is to identify whether text-or humanbased approaches perform better in explaining the effects ad exposure may have on voter behavior or attitudes. For this I implement a series of vignette experiments in the CCES.
In these, I ask respondents to assess two real candidates running in 2014, given their policy positions and a randomly selected ad statement attributed to one of the candidates. A representative protocol for the vignette is presented in Figure II The candidate who appears is randomly selected. The message that is then attributed to the selected candidate is also randomly chosen, drawn from the set of positive ads scored previously in the CCES party guessing experiments. 26 Respondents then indicate where they would place both candidates on a liberal-conservative scale, as well as whether they would support either of the candidates. The main finding of interest here is whether being randomly exposed to a candidate's ad influences voter impressions of that candidate in 26 An important cross-over element is used across the CCES, so that respondents never provide guesses for any ads that they could see in this candidate vignette experiment.
Further, partisan information is never revealed or primed in these vignettes. The policy prefaces are meant to convey that the candidates have taken polarized positions on taxes and budgets, which should help voters make inferences about the overall ideological positions these candidates take on other issues, and possibly their partisanship.
between the candidates on the ideological scale. The x-axis in these plots indicates the scaled location of each of the ads, as scored by (a) Wordscores, (b) Wordfish, and (c) Party
Perceptions. Thus, the plots illustrate how the average candidate placements change for each candidate associated with each ad, as the scaled ads go from most liberal to most conservative using each scaling approach.
Quite interestingly, as seen in Figure 7 understanding of how incumbents and challengers compete for legislative office in contemporary elections. An ancillary benefit of this larger collection is that it can further bolster the validity and reliability of party perception scores, by showing that these meaningfully predict behaviors of politicians in election mode, even when scores are collected using a non-random procedure in a highly non-representative coder sample.
28
The 2,103 general election ads were scaled using 654 coders in a third MTurk wave implemented in 2016. In total, MTurk coders made 94,534 party inferences about these 2,103 ads on the basis of simulations using the prior MTurk and CCES scores. These simulations (presented in the Appendix), indicated that at least 40 inferences per ad would be needed to recover an expected correlation of ρ = 0.98 under repeated sampling.
Additional simulations showed that approximately 60% of the 3,255 ads would need to 28 As done in the Appendix, this expanded set of scores can also be incorporated into automated machine learning approaches to make useful predictions about political texts in other campaign years, and beyond campaign advertising.
be scored to make quality predictions about the remaining left-out portion. This latter finding motivated the choice to evaluate a random sample of 2,103 ads (64.6%), with the 1,152 remaining left out for further analysis. 29 Scoring in this third MTurk wave did not follow the above experimental protocol. MTurk workers were encouraged to perform as many coding tasks as they desired. Further, ads were not randomly assigned to coders, though the coding tasks were randomly ordered so these did not appear in systematically related ways (e.g., party or issue-focus of ads). Positive and negative ads were again evaluated separately. Half of the 518 contrast ads were randomly assigned to be evaluated alongside 1,165 positive ads, while the remaining half were evaluated with 420 negative ads. 30 Finally, each coding task involved making two inferences, one for each of a randomized pair of ad statements.
31
In this experimental design, the modal respondent only provided two inferences (i.e., completed one paired-task), while the maximum number of inferences was 1,630 (815 paired-tasks), with a mean of 144.6 guesses (72.3 paired-tasks) per coder. Further, to maximize efficiency in the coding, no covariates were collected about this set of respondents, including information on their PID. Consequently and critically in this experiment, it was decided ex ante to preclude the possibility of using covariates to make any 29 Notably, 55 of these latter left-out ads were also included in the original 200 sampled, so that supervised predictions using the 2,103 ads could be evaluated using actual party perception scores as benchmarks.
30 This permits an analysis of the scoring effects of using a negative versus a positive frame for randomly assigned contrast ads, which typically include information about both attacked and promoted candidates. Interestingly, I find that attack frames induce more polarized ratings of contrast ads than do promotion frames.
31 Candidates' names, including race and gender, were randomized to assess how these impact variation in inferences, especially interacting with issues. Candidates' states are also randomized when mentioned.
adjustments for sampling variation in the scores. Further, coders were encouraged to provide as many evaluations about ads as they wanted, potentially magnifying the nonrepresentativeness of this as a convenience sample. In spite of these design choices, the resulting correlation between aggregate party perception scores for the 145 ads overlapping with the above sample, remained a robust ρ = 0.90, evidencing a remarkable reliability in the task. (A scatterplot of this association is shown in Figure XVIII in the Appendix.)
Turning to the analysis, following the above approach (shown in Figure 1 between the kinds of attacks incumbents air and their own prior legislative records or the attitudes of their constituents. 32 Yet, unlike in positive ads, position-taking in negative attacks does largely reflect the partisan polarization exhibited in Congress. This is seen 32 There is a similarly weak association between a challenger's attack and the attacked incumbent's DW-Nominate score and jurisdiction presidential vote. Results are shown here by the considerable divergence in the scores between Democrats and Republicans that is largely independent of a legislative record or district attitudes. Consequently, incumbents appear to be fighting to win the political center in a campaign, in an effort to differentiate themselves from their more partisan and polarized records in office, while pinning down opponents as truly out of touch with the voters (e.g., Henderson 2015) .
In broad strokes, using perception scores, we get a better glimpse of the contemporary campaign environment: candidates are somewhat faithful in discussing their legislative record during elections, but aim to mask, rather than clarify the issue priorities and positions that substantially differentiate them from their partisan opponents.
Given this tailoring, candidates may also target their ad messages to the mass of voters paying attention at particular moments in a campaign. Prior data limitations, however, have made it difficult to assess whether candidates substantially reposition over the course of an election cycle (Clouse 2006; McCarty and Poole 1998) . Using new party perception scores, I explore the degree to which congressional candidates systematically drift during elections. Results are presented in Figure 9 , which display densities of Democratic (blue) and Republican (red) candidates' positive ad-scores at various stages in the 2008 election. to October (-0.08), though this is statistically indistinguishable from zero. There is weak evidence that messages become more ideologically similar in the lead-in to Election Day, though again the distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
I develop an experimental approach to scale the partisan content of political ads. Accordingly, I randomly assign messages to survey subjects who are asked to infer the party and ideology of featured candidates. I find that these party perception scores, produced using a crowdsourcing design, are synonymous to an ideological dimension in voters' minds, remarkably reliable across sample and design conditions, and significantly out-perform standard automated approaches to scaling text through validation. I also demonstrate that this inferential design is extensible, and can reliably score a large number of ads (in a cost-effective manner), yielding much less measurement error than automated alternatives. This method represents an important advance in scaling text, particularly in contexts where strategic speech frustrates standard ideal point models.
This inferential method is likely to be most effective when speech is strategic or sparse in ways that limit the accuracy of text-based approaches. Even when automated scaling works well, inference experiments can be a useful mode of validation to insure that the dimensionality recovered is both grounded in realism and meaningful to voters. This latter point is especially important when validating scores, which necessitates making a theoretical assumption about the relationship between objects being scaled, and objects used in validation. Typically, any deviation between a new scale and its 'correct' benchmark is thought to indicate poor measurement, as opposed to imperfect theoretical knowledge.
For example, there is heated disagreement about how to model position-taking in campaign competition. Using legislative voting to predict candidate advertising makes the assumption that ads are meant to reflect prior legislative positions. Yet, a plausible alternative is that politicians pander to centrist voters. Each assumption suggests a different way to validate ad-scores, either or both could be incorrect, and the only way to be sure is to validate both benchmarks against an otherwise valid scaling of ads. Such efforts could continue in endless circularity between measurement and theory.
Inferential measures offer a path out of this circularity. Party perceptions measure whatever partisan information voters actually observe in ads. Hence this can provide an independent basis (e.g., replicability, exploring bias conditional on covariates) to judge the quality of the resulting scale. If campaign positioning is seen to reflect an appeal to centrists as scaled by voters, then this illuminates how average citizens understand the campaign messaging they are likely to receive. This does presume that ads are meant to be observed and understood by voters. But if false, then this probably precludes the scholarly enterprise of scaling ads. By tapping independent voter judgements, party perception scores can clarify important theoretical questions, without needing to reference other scalings to support its validity. Breaking the tautology, inferential scores can enhance the information value of comparing automated scalings to each other by providing evidence about the assumptions guiding those comparisons.
Beyond scaling partisanship in ads, the inferential approach outlined here can be generalized to measure a much wider array of dimensions contained in speech and text data. One future extension is to randomize candidates' names, alongside gender and race, to investigate how voters incorporate these cues when judging the ideological orientation of ads. Perception scores can also be incorporated into a wide variety of machine learning tasks, like measuring partisanship in other election cycles or in supervising the multidimensional scaling of ad-words. While the application in this study is scaling ads in the U.S. two-party context, the inferential design can be expanded to other kinds of speech, and in other partisan or political contexts (e.g., incumbency, candidate quality, multipartism). The limiting factor in extending this inferential approach is the cognitive complexity of the survey instruments, though to a lesser extent the crowdsourcing labor costs as well. Some tasks are not likely to be particularly well-suited to using voter inferences (e.g., regulatory policy, patronage party-systems). Yet, when both factors are low, crowdsourcing inferences may offer a powerful way to analyze text data, especially when prior automated approaches have proven unreliable.
More generally, there is no denying that the 'text-as-data' revolution has been im-mensely productive in political science, and elsewhere. But this advance has not fundamentally eliminated or supplanted the importance of human judgement. Indeed, human coding should and is likely to play a critical role in validating automated analysis of text.
Furthermore, in certain cases, human judgement can be a powerful and effective tool of measurement, that can compliment and improve the analysis of text data.
